Ideas from 'Thought and Reality' by Michael Dummett [1997], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Thought and Reality (Gifford Lectures)' by Dummett,Michael [OUP 2006,0-19-920727-5]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

8166	Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence

8173	Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

8179	The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

8184	Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism

8185	We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

8163	Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths

8161	We know we can state facts, with true statements

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

8180	'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique

8178	Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought

8174	The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought

8175	A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique

8165	To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions

8168	To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification

8181	A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic

8182	Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power

8183	If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

8176	We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning

8170	Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

8169	We can't distinguish a proposition from its content

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure

8186	Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

8167	If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes